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STEMMING THE TIDE OF FOSTER CARE
RUNAWAYS: A DUE PROCESS PERSPECTIVE
Kevin M. Ryan*
Twenty days after his birth, Kevin E. was placed in a foster home.' He
lingered for eight years in the District of Columbia's overcrowded foster care
system before he finally became free for adoption.2 By then, he had exper-
ienced so many changes in placement that his self-esteem and ability to trust
others were severely diminished.3 His behavior eventually reflected this
emotional tumult: he endured episodes of head banging, suicidal thoughts,
hallucinations and periodic rages.4 Like many foster children who perceive
repeated abandonment, Kevin began running away. Social workers finally
moved him to a residential treatment center, but much of the damage to his
fragile psyche already appeared permanent.5 Experts at the center con-
cluded that a family setting would prove unmanageable for Kevin and might
prompt him to run away again.6
* Skadden Public Interest Fellow and Staff Attorney, Covenant House, New York; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1992; B.A., The Catholic University of America, 1989.
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generous financial support. This Article is dedicated to the author's family, particularly Clare,
Daniel, Eileen and James Ryan.
1. See LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 985 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding unconstitu-
tional certain aspects of the District of Columbia's administration of its foster care system).
2. Id.
3. Id. Dr. William Clotworthy, Jr., a child psychiatrist who evaluated Kevin, "testified
that he believed that the frequent changes in placements were each interpreted by Kevin as
being his fault and signifying that something was wrong with him. Each was an enormous
blow." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. "Dr. Clotworthy opined that if social workers had been attuned to his special
needs earlier, the outcome for Kevin could have been quite different." Id.
6. Id.
Reports from the [residential treatment] institution in 1989 indicate that [Kevin]
might not be able to tolerate the intensity of a family setting due to his history of
abandonment .... Dr. Clotworthy expects Kevin to experience regression and an
increase in symptoms when he is forced to leave [the treatment center].
Id.
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Unlike Kevin, sixteen-year-old, Janet D. waited only three years to run
away from foster care for the first time." Although she occasionally ran to
her natural family, Janet was never a likely candidate for reunion with them.
Her father had died the previous year and her mentally retarded mother was
unable to care for herself, let alone her twelve children.' When Janet turned
up at a local hospital after absconding the first time, the medical staff noticed
she had been physically abused 9 and suffered from "acute exposure and feet
frostbite."' ° Over the next four months, Janet ran away from foster care at
least six more times, often returning in worse condition."' She was shuttled
among sites and was housed, for most of this period, in a temporary over-
night shelter unequipped to treat her emotional disturbance. 12 Instead of
receiving rehabilitative counseling,"3 Janet faced punishment each time she
7. See Janet D. v. Carros, 362 A.2d 1060, 1063-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). Janet ran away
after overhearing that she was to be removed from her foster care home by the court. Id. at
1064. Although Kevin E. spent more time in foster care, Janet better represents the typical
runaway because of her age. In fact, two-thirds of runaways do not abscond until they are at
least 13 years old. David Shaffer & Carl Caton, Runaway and Homeless Youth in New York
City: A Report to the Ittleson Foundation (N.Y. State Psychiatric Inst. 1984).
8. Janet D., 362 A.2d at 1063.
9. Id. at 1064.
At first [Janet] had returned to her mother and sister, but when they refused to keep
her, she went to a neighbor's home. There... "[t]he man of the house then declared
he wouldn't keep her unless she was cleaner and put her on the kitchen floor, sat on
her, and shaved all her hair from her head."
Id.
10. Id. "'Janet... was very unkempt [sic] and dirty, dressed in clothing that was really
heavy winter clothing, [and] had been barefooted.'" Id.
11. Id. at 1064-66. For example, one summer evening when she was returning to the
overnight shelter from which she had absconded, Janet was attacked by a group of boys who
undressed her and whipped her so severely that she suffered long welts and abrasions over her
body. Id. at 1065-66.
12. Id. at 1065. Janet was considered mentally retarded because she scored 64 and 76 on
two IQ tests. Id. at 1063. According to the American Association on Mental Deficiency (now
the American Association on Mental Retardation), "mental retardation refers to significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive be-
havior and manifested during the developmental period." AMERICAN ASS'N ON MENTAL DE-
FICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION I (Herbert J. Grossman ed., 1983). A
"significantly subaverage intellectual functioning" refers to individuals whose IQ scores are 70
or below.
Id. However, Janet's teachers believed her school work exhibited academic potential mar-
ginally superior to the work expected from a student with her IQ scores. Janet D., 362 A.2d at
1063 n.9. A local social worker, in fact, attributed Janet's problems to emotional disturbance
rather than mental retardation. Id. at 1063.
13. Even if Janet was properly diagnosed as mentally retarded, she was still a prime candi-
date for enrollment in a runaway prevention/counseling program. See James W. Ellis & Ruth
A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 424
n.54 (1985) ("The consequences of the mental impairment, including deficits in adaptive be-
havior, may be ameliorated through education and habilitation. Therefore, it is not accurate to
state categorically that mental retardation is 'permanent' or 'incurable.' ").
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returned to the shelter. She was confined to a cottage and forced to wear
pajamas during the day as a means of restricting her movement.14 The local
child welfare agency never provided Janet with the individualized treat-
ment 15 necessary for her habilitation. As a result, her absconding behavior
persisted. 16
14. "[A]lthough [Janet] was required to wear pajamas and robe during the entire six
weeks (except for four days) that she was at McIntyre Shelter, she ran away five times." Janet
D., 362 A.2d at 1066. She testified at trial that she had kept a set of street clothes downstairs
at the shelter, taking them along when she ran away. Id. at 1065.
15. See id. at 1068. "Training" and "habilitation" describe services provided to the men-
tally retarded, while "treatment" usually characterizes services rendered to the mentally ill.
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 n.1 (1982); John A. Rizzo, Note, Beyond
Youngberg: Protecting the Fundamental Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 51 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1064, 1074 n.53 (1983). In this Article, the words "treatment" and "services" are used
interchangeably, among other words and phrases, to describe services rendered to children in
foster care.
16. See Janet D., 362 A.2d at 1065; see, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.)
("Without a program of individual treatment [for incarcerated youth] the result may be that
the juveniles will not be rehabilitated, but warehoused... ; their interests and those of the state
and the school thereby being defeated."), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). See generally
DOROTHY MILLER ET AL., RUNAWAYS-ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THEIR OWN LAND: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR SERVICE (1980) (suggesting that runaway prevention programs could have measur-
able success among runaways).
1993]
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Janet's and Kevin's stories are not uncommon. 17 Indeed, many foster
children 8 suffer from inadequate supervision and care,19 and a large number
resort to running away from their placements.
This Article examines the troubling prevalence of running behavior
among foster children, and the disparate factors which contribute to the phe-
nomenon. The author considers whether foster children possess special con-
stitutional rights arising out of the state's custodial relationship to children
living in substitute care. Concluding that such a constitutional entitlement
17. See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1154-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (describing the case history of Ricardo, a recurrent foster care runaway); see
Marcia Lowry, When the Family Breaks Down: Massive and Misapplied Intervention by the
State, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 53, 63 (Patricia A. Vardin &
Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979).
[W]hen a child in foster care shows symptoms of disturbance, the child may receive
adequate treatment if the disturbance falls within the range of disturbances agencies
are comfortable treating. If not, the child will be sent off to a state mental institution,
or cycled through the juvenile court as a disruptive child. Or the child may be
shipped to one of the increasing number of institutions located in states with lax
regulatory standards that make a business of housing the children no one else wants.
Id.
Passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 was Congress' re-
sponse to a marked rise in juvenile arrests, and to the subsequent avalanche of popular criti-
cism attacking the system's preference for punishment over rehabilitation. The Act created
one federal agency to tackle the problems of juvenile delinquency and nurture a national, ther-
apeutic response to children in trouble with the law. Federal financial incentives were offered
to states whose philosophy and programming comported with certain federal standards. Pri-
mary among those standards was a deinstitutionalization requirement that proscribed the im-
prisonment of minors for behavior that was not also a crime for adults, such as running away.
In many ways, however, the system still remains focused on what it knows best-punishment.
Runaways account for 20% of the minors incarcerated in secure detention facilities, often a
consequence of judicial frustration with recidivist runners. Melissa Sickmund, Runaways in
Juvenile Courts, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (United States Dep't of Justice, Nov. 1990); see
also MILLER, supra note 16, at 52 (finding that sample foster care runaways had experienced
suspension or expulsion from school 79% of the time, more than any other class of runaway
children); Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of
Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1988) (arguing that the increased rates
of mental health admissions reflect societal inability to deal with difficult children).
18. The words "children" and "youth" are used interchangeably in this Article to refer to
individuals under the age of 18.
19. See, e.g., K.H. ex. rel Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 1990) (describ-
ing the case of a foster child neglected and sexually abused in state care); Taylor v. Ledbetter,
818 F.2d 791, 792 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (describing the case of a foster child rendered comatose by
physical beatings sustained in foster care), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); LaShawn A. v.
Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 974 (D.D.C. 1991) (finding that foster children are not provided with
necessary services and proper care); Doe, 670 F. Supp. at 1171 (holding that children housed in
temporary overnight shelters are deprived of adequate living facilities); Mary Jordan, Foster
Parent Scarcity Causing Crisis In Care, WASH. POST, July 20, 1986, at Fl (reporting that a
Virginia grand jury cited "the acute shortage of suitable shelter for the 6,000 neglected, abused
and disabled children" in state care as a factor contributing to the death of a foster child).
[Vol. 42:271
Foster Care Runaways
does exist, this Article argues that foster children have a right to receive
screening and counseling services designed to prevent runaway behavior.2"
Part I of this Article describes the current conditions of the foster care
system. Part II surveys federal court decisions that apply the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause in custodial settings.2 Furthermore, Part II
examines the meaning of state "custody" and concludes that the term should
include foster care. Part III criticizes a recent trend among federal courts of
withholding due process protections from children voluntarily placed in fos-
ter care by their natural parents, arguing that the trend is illogical and un-
fair. Part IV considers the scope of the due process rights afforded foster
care children, and contends that these rights include the provision of mental
health screening and runaway prevention services.
I. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: FOSTER CARE RUNAWAYS
A recent survey, conducted by the National Association of Social Work-
ers, reported that more than twenty percent of the children living in home-
less shelters across the country arrived there directly from foster care, while
thirty-eight percent had lived in foster care at some time during the prior
year.22 Another study, published by the New York State Council on Chil-
20. Dr. Edward Schor, an associate professor at the University of New Mexico School of
Medicine, Department of Pediatrics, has written extensively on health issues affecting children
in foster care. See, e.g., Edward L. Schor, A Summary of a White Paper on the Health Care of
Children in Foster Care, 8 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 16, 22 (1987). He believes that "[a]ll
children should have a placement examination preferably prior to entering their first foster
care placement .... A standardized, screening mental health assessment should be completed
within 30 days of placement." Id. at 17. If Dr. Schor's recommendations were implemented,
foster children who comported with the runaway's profile could be identified, supervised and
enrolled in a therapeutic prevention program.
21. This Article focuses on the constitutional, rather than the statutory, rights of children
in foster care. A recent Supreme Court decision held that a provision of the Adoption Assist-
ance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986),
does not afford foster children with an enforceable private right of action to sue states for
federal statutory services outlined in the Act. See Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
AACWA describes a variety of foster care services, including a case plan system and a follow-
up program of case review, and obligates states receiving federal assistance to make "reason-
able efforts" to keep families together by preventing removal and facilitating reunion of family
members. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court in Suter did not address the constitutional rights of children in foster
care. See Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1363; see also infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Suter).
22. See THE NAT'L ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROGRAMS FOR RUNAWAY AND HOMELESS YOUTH AND PROGRAMS
FOR OLDER YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE (1991). Some studies indicate that approximately half
of the runaway population have spent time in foster care or lived in a group residence. See
MARJORIE ROBERTSON, HOMELESS YOUTH IN HOLLYWOOD; PATrERNS OF ALCOHOL USE:
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM (1989);
1993]
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dren and Families, revealed that as many as half of the nation's homeless
youth were raised in foster care. 23 A court-ordered review of the foster care
system in the District of Columbia indicated that in August of 1992, twenty-
five percent of the city's foster children were missing and designated as "ab-
sconders. ' '24 These sobering statistics are cause for concern, especially since
foster children account for only about 0.007% of the total child popula-
tion.2' The disproportionate number of foster children among the 3,288
children who run away each day,26 suggests both a strong susceptibility of
foster youth to running behavior and the failure of many foster care agencies
to respond effectively. The bleak realities confronting most runaways make
this systemic failure both urgent and egregious.
Many runaways, finding themselves homeless and poor, turn to prostitu-
tion as a means of support.27 Others, particularly foster care runaways, buy
JOSEPH RYAN & ARTHUR DOYLE, OPERATION OUTREACH: A STUDY OF RUNAWAY CHIL-
DREN IN NEW YORK CITY (1986).
23. See NEW YORK STATE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES, MEETING THE NEEDS
OF HOMELESS YOUTH: A REPORT OF THE HOMELESS YOUTH STEERING COMMITTEE 4-7
(1984). Apparently this is not just an urban phenomenon. According to the General Account-
ing Office, "[h]omeless youth seeking assistance were evident in both rural and urban commu-
nities." United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Paul Simon, U.S.
Senate, Homelessness: Homeless and Runaway Youth Receiving Services at Federally Funded
Shelters 3 (1989) (providing an overview of the Runaway Youth Act and the general plight of
homeless youth).
24. Keith A. Harriston, D.C. Foster Children Are Missing: Sampling of Cases Shows "Ab-
sconders," WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1992, at CI.
25. The fraction is the author's estimate, based on the following data. There are approxi-
mately 64,083,000 children residing in the United States. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1991, tbl. 12 (111th ed. 1991) (depicting population trends in 1989). Though no one knows
precisely how many children are living in foster care, Dr. Toshio Tatara of the American
Public Welfare Association, reports that approximately 429,000 children were being raised in
foster care at the end of 1991, the last year for which data was available prior to publication.
Telephone Interview with Dr. Toshio Tatara, Director of the American Public Welfare Associ-
ation's Voluntary Cooperative Information System (VCIS) (Apr. 1, 1993). VCIS has been
collecting substitute care data from state child welfare programs since 1982. Id.
26. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A VISION FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE: AN AGENDA FOR
THE 1990s: A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET at xxxvi (1989) (depicting "one day in the lives
of American children" as being filled with egregious conditions) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S DE-
FENSE FUND].
27. One study found that two-thirds of all teenage prostitutes were runaways. Silbert &
Pines, Entrance Into Prostitution, YOUTH & SoC'Y 471-500 (1982); see Christopher M. Earls &
Helene David, Early Family and Sexual Experiences of Male and Female Prostitutes, CAN-
ADA'S MENTAL HEALTH J., Dec. 1990, at 7, 11 (describing the runaway/prostitution phenom-
enon); D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILDREN OF THE NIGHT: A STUDY OF ADOLESCENT
PROSTITUTION 1 (1985) (examining the challenging "social problem[s]" caused by "adolescent
prostitution"); see also MILLER, supra note 16, at 40 (reporting that 19% of boys and 23% of
girls who run away resort to prostitution as a means of support). Children who run away from
foster care are more likely to become prostitutes than other runaways. Id. at 57. Twenty-eight
[Vol. 42:271
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and sell illegal drugs.28 The runaway population's penchant for drug use
and survival sex accounts for the "alarmingly high prevalence rate" of HIV
infection among runaway youth.29 Compounding the more immediate dan-
percent of the youth running away from foster care engage in prostitution, and 85% resort to
dealing drugs. Id. at 40.
New York's legislature reported in the Legislative Declaration and Purpose accompanying
its Runaway and Homeless Youth Act of 1978 that "juveniles are running away from home at
alarming rates." Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 532 (Consol.
1983). "Runaway youth are without protection and the ordinary means of support, exposed to
unnecessary danger and become victims of various illicit businesses which prey upon their
vulnerability." Id.
A partial explanation for this behavior may be the predisposition of a particular class of
foster children, those who have suffered abuse and neglect, to disruptive behaviors. According
to Cathy S. Windom, The Role of Placement Experiences in Mediating the Criminal Conse-
quences of Early Childhood Victimization, 61 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 195, 195-209
(1991), the class of abused and neglected children among the foster care population "may
account for the high rates of delinquency, adult criminality and violent criminal behavior often
associated with children in foster care." Id. at 208; cf. Child Abuse and Neglect: Issues on
Innovation and Implementation, I PROC. OF 2D ANNUAL NAT'L CONF. ON CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 310 (Michael L. Lauderdale et al. eds., 1978) (examining the pervasive
problems created by childhood abuse, such as developmental delays, cognitive impairments
and behavioral problems, and offering legislative solutions and legal approaches to alleviate
this phenomenon). The large number of abused and neglected children in foster care may in
part explain why foster children are more likely to be admitted to mental health facilities than
children not placed in substitute care. See Child Support Enforcement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 102-441 (1991) (statement of Douglas J. Besharov) [hereinafter Hearings] (featuring
Illinois State Adolescent Psychiatric Hospitalization data for Birth Cohort FY 1969); see also
supra note 17.
28. See MILLER, supra note 16, at 57.
29. Rachel Stricof et al., HIV Seroprevalence in a Facility for Runaway and Homeless
Adolescents, 81 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 50, 53 (1991) (reporting that 5.3% of homeless/
runaway adolescents tested HIV positive in a 1987-1989 HIV seroprevalence study conducted
at Covenant House New York, a shelter for youth in crisis (Covenant House New York is
located on the West Side of mid-Manhattan and, over the past five years, has served an esti-
mated 28,000 discrete adolescents in its "Crisis Center" and "Mother/Child" program)). An-
other survey of the Covenant House population from 1989-1991 revealed that five percent of
the respondents claimed to be HIV positive. Christopher Bohling, Youth At Risk: A Statisti-
cal Portrait of a Sample of Adolescents Using the Services of Covenant House New York, 1-3
(1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author) (utilizing research by Neil Margetson,
former Research Director, and Cynthia Lipman, former Researcher/ Statistician of Covenant
House New York in compiling statistics on homeless children's health).
The Hetrick-Martin Institute for Lesbian and Gay Youth in New York City approximated
that the number of street youth testing seropositive ranged between 10 and 15 percent. Gina
Kolata, AIDS is Spreading in Teen-Agers: A New Trend, Alarming to Experts, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 1989, at Al. See generally Fern Shen, An Entrenched AIDS Incubator: In this Ugly
War, Urban Blight is Enemy's Breeding Ground, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1992, at Al. (report-
ing the prevalence of HIV at-risk behavior among the inner city poor and the role of commu-
nity outreach workers); Patricia Harty, Cherish the Children, IRISH AM. MAGAZINE, May
1992, at 21, 23 (describing the vulnerability of young prostitutes to HIV infection in an inter-
view with Sister Mary Rose McGeady of Covenant House).
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gers of street life, such as violence and disease,3 many runaways succumb to
a life of chronic indigence, ensnared by long-term homelessness and pov-
erty.31 A study of New York homeless men, published in the American
Journal of Psychiatry, revealed that many of them had spent time in foster
care as children.32 Deficient state intervention yields far-reaching conse-
quences that are best evidenced when ill-served foster children eventually
swell state public assistance rolls, and contribute to a new generation of de-
pendent adults and families.33
Foster care, however, does not always harm children.34 In fact, for the
majority of children placed quickly in permanent settings, the effects are
generally positive.35 Some studies indicate no long-term differences between
foster care youth and non-foster care youth.36 Given that the system can
30. One study reported that 42% of runaways were assaulted, 18.4% robbed and nearly
13% sexually assaulted while living on the streets. See ROBERTSON, supra note 22. The prev-
alence of HIV among runaway and homeless youth, see supra note 29 and accompanying text,
suggests that many runaways do not achieve safe and healthy returns to state care. The lethal
consequences of disease are occasionally compounded by the attendant violence of street life.
For example, Kerry Jacobsen, an Ombudsman (child advocate) for the Covenant House in
New Orleans from 1987 to 1990, reports several cases in which adolescent residents of the
shelter died as a result of street violence. Telephone Interview with Kerry Jacobsen, former
Ombudsman, Covenant House New Orleans (July 30, 1992).
31. See infra notes 32-33.
32. Ezra Susser et al., Childhood Experiences of Homeless Men, 144 AM. J. OF PSYCHIA-
TRY 1599-1601 (1987) (explaining a study of homeless men in New York shelters, which re-
vealed that, as children, they frequently resided without parents).
33. Marcia R. Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980's: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the
Warren Years, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE, 265, 267 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1988) ("[A] great deal of money is being spent on the
consequences of the failure to serve these children at earlier stages, through public assistance
payments as these children grow up and start their own dependent families, and as they be-
come clients of publicly funded mental health services and prisons."); Mari B. Maloney, Note,
Out of the Home Onto the Street: Foster Children Discharged Into Independent Living, 14
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 971, 972 n.12 (1986).
34. Windom, supra note 27, at 198 (discussing a study of 200 foster home placements
which concluded that substitute care was not the reason children experienced difficulty. The
1979 Palmer study actually concluded that foster children experienced "a decrease in behavior
problems.., from [the] time of placement to discharge.") Id. at 198. However, unsupervised
foster care, where children do not receive necessary services and treatment "can be worse than
the problems it was designed to solve." CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ISSUES, IN
SEARCH OF THE PAPER CHILDREN 17 (1982) [hereinafter PAPER CHILDREN]; see also John V.
Penn, A Model for Training Foster Parents in Behavior, 57 CHILD WELFARE J. 175 (1978)
(examining successful training programs).
35. Douglas J. Besharov, The Misuse of Foster Care: When the Desire to Help Children
Outruns the Ability to Improve Parental Functioning, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE
AND NEGLECT: POLICY AND PRACTICE 185, 190-92 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1986) (citing
research reported in MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED
CHILDREN 14 (1988)).
36. David Fanshel, Status Changes of Children in Foster Care: Final Results of the Colum-
bia University Longitudinal Study, 55 CHILD WELFARE J. 143 (1976); see also Besharov, supra
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have a positive impact on children, no single systematic defect explains why
so many children run away from foster care.37 A partial explanation for the
high incidence of runaways stems from the nature of the foster child's
problems, which, as in Janet D.'s case,3" often pre-date foster home place-
ment.39 Most of these children show signs of chronic illness when they enter
foster care," chiefly emotional disorders that go untreated because mental
health services are scarce.4 As a result of this phenomenon, a higher inci-
dence of inpatient mental health admissions exists among foster children
than among the non-foster care population.42 The failure of many state pro-
note 35, at 190 ("[T]he available research indicates that foster care meets the emotional needs
of many children. Many maltreated children do very well in foster care.") One of the most
thorough longitudinal studies of foster children suggests that "the well-being of the majority of
the children improved, in terms of physical development, IQ, and school performance, after a
six-month period in foster care." WALD, supra note 35, at 14 (analyzing the research of David
Fanshel, supra).
37. Marc Posner, THE RUNAWAY RISK REDUCTION PROJECT ASSESSMENT REPORT,
(Educ. Dev. Ctr. 23 1992) (citing L. Kaplan, Conference, Youth Who Run From Residential
Placement: Working Toward A Solution." (Danvers, MA: Community Program Innovations
1990) At a multidisciplinary Conference on "Youth Who Run From Residential Placement,"
the author attempted to:
identify the reasons that youth so often flee residential placements. They suggested
that this is the result of a number of factors, including:
the failure of social service agencies to establish a level of trust and a sense of being
helped in their clients
inadequate staffing, which makes it difficult for social service workers to get to
know youth and respond to their needs in a timely manner
feelings of isolation, disempowerment, and uncertainty caused by placements for
indefinite periods (often marked by frequent transfers among placements)
lack of family involvement once the youth is placed
youth perception that placements are unsafe because they are mixed in with others
who are different from themselves in terms of age, sex, race, and life experience
lack of consequences: in many situations, nothing happens when a youth runs from
placement.
Id.
38. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Matthew B. Bogin & Beth Goodman, Special Education for Children in State
Custody, 7 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 8 (1986) ("Many children who enter.., child welfare
systems have some type of disability."); Paul Fine, Clinical Aspects of Foster Care, in FOSTER
CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 206, 207 (Martha J. Cox & Roger D.
Cox eds., 1985) ("A 1973 study of several hundred New York City foster children found that
45% suffered from at least one chronic medical problem. Seventy percent were rated moder-
ately or severely mentally disturbed .... My colleagues and I found similar pathologies ... in
a Nebraska mental health foster care program."); Schor, supra note 20, at 17 ("The
psychosocial history of children in foster care has a strong impact on their health status.").
40. See Fine, supra note 39, at 207-08. See generally FLORENCE KAVALER & MAR-
GARET R. SWIRE, FOSTER-CHILD HEALTH CARE (1983) (detailing the characteristics of fos-
ter children and their families).
41. See Linnea Klee & Neal Halfon, Mental Health Care for Foster Children in Califor-
nia, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT J. 63-74 (1987).
42. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 27.
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grams to extend screening, counseling, and other rehabilitative services-
essentially, "treatment"-to runaways and potential runaways results in a
higher rate of running behavior among foster youth than among other
children. 3
The failure of state-based child protective programs does not result merely
from institutional passivity. Often the problem is not that foster care does
too little for children, but that it does too much to them, by encouraging,
even forcing, children to run away." This is largely a consequence of the
inherent incompatibility between the way the system is designed to work and
the way it actually operates. Foster care is intended to be a short-term solu-
tion for children whose parents are unable or unwilling to provide them with
a proper home. In fact, many children stay in foster care longer than neces-
sary.45 In 1988, over thirty-seven percent of the nation's foster children had
been in substitute care for more than two years, and nearly one-quarter of
them had been there for at least three years.46 As foster care is meant to
establish only short-term relationships, most agencies frown on the forma-
tion of attachments between children and foster parents.17 These relation-
43. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Besharov, supra note 35, at 192 ("There is a dark side of foster care ....
[For a large subset (generally children who cannot be quickly returned home or freed for
adoption), foster care is very harmful.").
45. Robert A. Burt, Children as Victims, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVES 37, 38 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979) ("The New York City
Comptroller's office reported that some 11,000 children in foster care-more than a third of all
city children-had been kept in that status 'an average of five and one-half years longer than
necessary ... '); Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decision Making: In Search of the Least
Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1757-58 (1987) (stating that children are frequently
placed in foster care unnecessarily and remain there too long); Children, Twice Neglected,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1992, at A22 (reporting that many New York foster children "have been
removed from families unnecessarily and kept in foster care too long"); Massachusetts Foster
Care Shaken by Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at 33.
As of July [1992], the state had 13,000 children in foster or group care. Of those,
twenty percent have been in temporary placement for more than four years. While
forty-five percent have remained where they are placed, twenty-two percent have
changed homes at least once and thirty-two percent have changed two or more times
Id.; see LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 966 (D.D.C. 1991) ("Thirty-seven percent of
children in the District's foster care system have been in care for four or more years .... );
PAPER CHILDREN, supra note 34, at 18 ("[A] 1978 New Jersey study showed that the typical
child remains in care an average of three and a half years. Of the half million children now in
foster care nationwide, 100,000 have been there for over six years.").
46. TOSHIO TATARA, CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN IN SUBSTITUTE AND ADOPTIVE
CARE: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE VCIS NATIONAL CHILD WELFARE DATA BASE
100 (1991) (summarizing data from 23 states which accounted for 65.9% of all children living
in foster care in 1988).
47. Lowry, supra note 17, at 63.
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ships are normally severed when filial bonds develop," sometimes as quickly
as 24 hours after the local agency discovers the situation.4 9 Despite the con-
sensus that such mobility has a devastating impact on children, ° it remains
commonplace.5
Most obstacles to the effective administration of foster care remain preva-
lent despite numerous reform efforts, most notably congressional enactment
48. Id.; see, e.g., In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 156 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1959) (upholding a
state agency's right to remove a foster child from placement on the basis of bonding between
the child and foster parent). The Supreme Court addressed foster care's "attachment prob-
lem," in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), as follows:
The development of such ties [between foster parents and foster children] points up
an intrinsic ambiguity of foster care that is central to this case. The warmer and
more homelike environment of foster care is intended to be its main advantage over
institutional child care, yet because in theory foster care is intended to be only tem-
porary, foster parents are urged not be become too attached to the children in their
care. Indeed, the New York courts have upheld removal from a foster home for the
very reason that the foster parents had become too emotionally involved with the
child.
Id. at 836-37 n.40. (citations omitted); see also In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299 (1992) (bond-
ing with foster parents is not considered an extraordinary circumstance that requires the
awarding of parental custody to foster parents instead of natural parents).
49. PAPER CHILDREN, supra note 34, at 19 ("[Iln most cases, a child can be removed at a
day's notice," in New Jersey, even though the practice is not common.).
50. Id.; see VICTOR PIKE ET AL., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WEL-
FARE, PERMANENT PLANNING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A HANDBOOK FOR SOCIAL
WORKERS 4 (1977).
A foster child who moves many times, or who constantly fears that he may have to
move, can suffer devastating effects on his emotional health. He may become defen-
sive, fearful, suspicious, and, after repeated moves, he may eventually protect himself
from further disappointment and rejection by being less willing to invest in child-
parent relationships. Eventually, he loses the capacity.
Id.; see also Fine, supra note 39, at 208-09 ("[M]ultiple traumatic displacements and reunions
are likely to be seriously disruptive and may eventuate in aggressive, hyperactive, or opposi-
tional behaviors."); infra note 68.
51. In New Jersey, for example, the average child has two to three foster homes during
substitute care. PAPER CHILDREN, supra note 34, at 19. In 1982, 43% of foster children had
experienced multiple placements nationwide. By 1983, that figure leaped to 53. 1 %. See Theo-
dore J. Stein, Foster Care for Children, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 641 (Anne
Minahan et al. eds., 18th ed. 1987).
At the close of fiscal year 1988, 22.3% of foster children had experienced three to five place-
ments, and nearly seven percent had endured six or more placements. TATARA, supra note 46
(summarizing data which represented 58.9% of the national foster care population at the end
of 1988). It is estimated that better than half of all children in foster care during 1988 were
subject to more than one placement. Id.
In Utah, nearly three quarters of the state's foster children experience at least two place-
ments, and an alarming 31.9 percent endure four or more placements. Marcia Henry, NYCL
Sues Utah Child Welfare System, YOUTH LAW NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 6 (citing UTAH
DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, THE NATIONAL FOSTER CARE CRISIS AND UTAH CHILD WEL-
FARE (1992)).
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of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA). 52
Lawmakers intended this legislation as a response to many of the problems
associated with foster care, including multiple placements, unnecessary re-
moval and lengthy separations.53 The Act specifically called for a restruc-
turing of federal financial incentives to encourage state agencies to find
permanent homes for foster children "by making it possible for them to re-
turn to their own families or by placing them in adoptive homes."'54 The
decidedly non-interventionist philosophy which informed much of AACWA
52. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 513 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 608(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
53. During the early 1970s, an increase in state-based child welfare programs led to a
sharp rise in the states' reliance on foster care. See Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect
Children and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 700-17
(1990). It became clear to most child'welfare proponents that augmented reliance did not
advance the state's "predominantly therapeutic-or, in the vernacular, . . . 'social work'-
response to the problems of child abuse and child neglect," but instead created a new series of
problems that revolved around the state's failure to rehabilitate troubled families, or offer fos-
ter children a short-term, stable haven. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL
WORKER: LIABILITY FOR SERVING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 76 (1985) (Douglas Besharov
is a Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. and the first director of
the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect); see also Garrison, supra note 45, at 1753-
54.
Prior to 1980 and the enactment of AACWA, the federal government made significant finan-
cial incentives available to the states in order to maintain local foster care programs, but pro-
vided hardly any funding for programs aimed at keeping families united. Passage of AACWA
in 1980 was Congress' attempt to shift the balance in favor of family preservation.
54. S. REP. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450,
1451. The law conditions the receipt of federal funds upon "reasonable efforts" by the states to
prevent abused and neglected children from being removed from their homes and to reunite
separated biological families. Id. at 1451; see UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
& UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, BETTER
FEDERAL PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION CAN CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVING STATE FOSTER
CARE PROGRAMS at i (1984).
[T]he Congress amended the Social Security Act through the enactment of the Adop-
tion Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. This act was aimed at encouraging
states to improve their foster care programs through greater efforts to find permanent
homes for children. The act provides funds for both maintenance payments (e.g., the
cost of basic living expenses, such as food, clothing and shelter) and foster care child
welfare services (e.g., counseling and referral services)....
Section 427 of the Social Security Act, as amended, provides financial incentives to
states to implement and operate a comprehensive set of services, procedures, and
safeguards intended to (1) avoid unnecessary removal of children from their homes,
(2) prevent extended stays in foster care, and (3) ensure that efforts are made to
reunify children with their families or place them for adoption.
Id.; see also MaryLee Allen et al., A Guide to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 575-611 (Mark Hardin & Diane Dodson eds.,
1983); Ruth Marcus, Court Shuts Out Foster Care Children, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1992, at
A3 (reporting aims of 1980 legislation).
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created a forceful movement in child welfare planning."5 The statute em-
phasized keeping families together and providing children with stable envi-
ronments.56 "Permanency planning,"" as it came to be called, basked in the
limelight of early success during the late 1970s. Several field experiments
demonstrated that it costs states less to offer families intensive reunion-ori-
ented services than to keep children in foster care. 58 These projects and,
more directly, AACWA's financial incentives, influenced state intervention
markedly. Social workers moved decisively to return many foster children
to their biological families and earn federal assistance for their beleaguered
agencies. By 1983, the number of children in foster care had plummeted to
half the population's high water mark in the late 1970s." 9
The safety net for children caught in the reapportionment of the foster
care population was community-based support services like those offered in
the permanency planning field experiments of the 1970s. In practice, how-
ever, biological parents received few of these services, often because of un-
derfunding by the state.' Even when programs were readily accessible,
their efficacy proved limited in certain instances. The success rate of com-
munity-based family counseling is largely diminished among "those parents,
estimated to be about [forty] percent of substantiated cases, who have serious
and deeply ingrained personality disturbances., 61 Most treatment programs
do not disturb "deep-seated patterns of child abuse and neglect.",62 As a
result of limited services and marginal success rates with the most troubled
55. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
56. For example, the statute mandated that, in order for a state to be eligible for payments
under AACWA, each state had to submit a plan which provided, inter alia, that the State
would make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove a child from the
home and place him in foster care. Pub. L. No. 96-273, 94 Stat. 500, 503 (codied as amended
at 43 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1982)).
57. Anthony N. Maluccio & Edith Fein, Permanency Planning: A Redefinition, 62 J. OF
POL'Y, PRAC. & PROG. 195, 197 (Child Welfare League of America, 1983). "Permanency
planning is the systematic process of carrying out, within a brief time-limited period, a set of
goal-directed activities designed to help children live in families that offer continuity of rela-
tionships with nurturing parents or caretakers and the opportunity to establish lifetime rela-
tionships." Id.
58. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 26, at 179; PIKE, supra note 50, at 1.14-1.18.
59. HOWARD J. KARGER & DAVID STOEsz, AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY: A
STRUCTURAL APPROACH 235-36 (1990). In 1977, 500,000 children were in foster care. Id. at
236. Six years later, that number was nearly halved to 251,000. Id. Another study found that
the estimated number of children in foster care dipped from 500,000 in 1977 to 237,000 in
1982. ALENE B. RUSSELL & CYNTHIA M. TRAINOR, AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION,
TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 42 (1984).
60. See KARGER & STOESZ, supra note 59, at 235-37.
61. Besharov, supra note 35, at 185.
62. Id. at 192 (citing Douglas J. Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present
Problems and Future Directions, 17 FAMILY L.Q. 151, 165 (1983)).
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families, many children were returned to foster care in the 1980s. 63 Ironi-
cally, "permanency planning" came to mean exactly the opposite of its con-
ceptual agenda for many youth.64 Instead of giving children a stable home
environment, agencies shuttled them from foster care to their original
homes, and back to foster care when local support services proved insuffi-
cient.6" Given the deleterious effects on children of even one episode of sepa-
ration from their families,66 multiple reunions and separations must have
compounded the already damaging and traumatic experience.67
For today's generation of long-term foster children, the failings of foster
care persist. The child welfare system continues to exacerbate separation
trauma by forcing children into a bureaucracy of multiple placements and
deficient services.68 Some studies even conclude that the incidence of abuse
63. After an initial dip in the number of children living in foster care during the early
1980s, there has been a marked increase in the number since 1982. The House Select Comm.
on Children, Youth and Families estimates that 276,000 children were in foster care in 1985.
STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, 100TH CONG., 2D
SESS., REPORT ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: KEY TRENDS IN THE 1980s 45 (Comm. Print
1988).
Dr. Tatara estimates that the number of children in foster care has risen from 280,000 in
1986 to 429,000 at the close of 1991. Telephone Interview with Dr. Toshio Tatara, supra note
25.
64. See supra note 57.
65. KARGER & STOESZ, supra note 59, at 235-36. Local community support services
have not failed all families. Fourteen states are presently committed to the "family-preserva-
tion movement," a program whose goal is to keep parents and children united. Katrine Ames
et al., Fostering The Family, NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1992, at 64. Within one year of finishing
"intense, short-term intervention to remove the risk, not the child," 80% of the client families
remain intact. Id.
66. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 889 (1975) ("While separation may
protect a child from being beaten by his family, the separation itself may seriously damage the
child's emotional health, particularly if the child is shifted from one temporary home to an-
other during the separation."); Fine, supra note 39, at 208 ("Separation from the biological
family almost certainly causes the child short-term distress."); see also JOHN BOWLBY, 3 AT-
TACHMENT AND Loss 397 (1980) (discussing the fact that, while in foster care, a child often
regards the care as "second best" and yearns for the absent parent); Ner Littner, The Impor-
tance of the Natural Parents to the Child in Placement, 54 J. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE 175,
197 (1975) (emphasizing the importance of foster parent recognition of the crucial significance
of the natural parents to the placed child).
67. See generally Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents:
Their Effect on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAMILY L.Q. 233 (1986)
(discussing the importance of the foster child's relationship to her natural parents).
68. Lowry, supra note 33, at 268 (stating that "child welfare systems often inflict addi-
tional harm on already damaged children"); Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for
Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 199, 207-08 (1988) (shuttling foster children from site to site compounds existing feelings
of rejection and loss experienced as a result of removal from the biological family). See gener-
ally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 9-26 (1979)
(discussing the negative effects of foster care on children).
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and neglect is significantly greater in foster homes than in non-foster
homes.69 Of course, public programs can never fully replace healthy fami-
lies. Nevertheless, it is imperative that an acknowledgement of the govern-
ment's limitations be tempered by a commitment to providing the best
possible foster care. Unfortunately, such a commitment appears tenuous in
states now pinched by a recessionary climate and changing popular
priorities.
There is still some good news amidst the gloomy reality. Evidence sug-
gests that much runaway behavior is avoidable,7 ° particularly when the run-
ning is recurrent, as is the case with most foster care runaways.7' In a two
year study of California runaways published in 1980, one-third of the repre-
sentative population responded affirmatively when asked if anything could
have changed their minds about leaving. 72 Nearly half those who said "yes"
would have stayed at home if longstanding problems were resolved and
eleven percent-all foster children-would not have run if an alternative
placement was offered.7 3 These responses suggest that foster children might
69. NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND
ABUSE REPORTING 10-11 (1978) (listing statistics on perpetrators and causes of abuse among
foster children); see also KENNETH WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS 36
(1976) (discussing the national dilemma regarding the treatment of juvenile offenders, specifi-
cally the flaws of the juvenile correction system which punishes a "condition, not a crime");
Mushlin, supra note 68, at 205-06 (stating that children in foster care are severely beaten, even
killed, and that they are also subject to sexual and verbal abuse, as well as a greater chance of
abuse than children in the general population).
There are no precise figures on how frequently children are abused in foster care or how
much abuse triggers running behavior. However, remarkable similarities exist between the
family dynamics of runaways and the family dynamics of abused and neglected children.
Sharon Kirsch, Adolescent Problems: Dynamics and Practice, in CHILD WELFARE: A SOURCE
BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE 289, 299 (Frank Maidman et al. eds., 1984). Abuse by
foster parents is more likely to trigger running behavior than abuse by biological parents to the
extent that children are free of psychological ties to their abusers. See supra note 66.
70. MILLER, supra note 16, at 209 ("Runaways often come from multiproblem families
... and between efforts of school counselors, welfare workers, and medical services, should be
relatively easy to identify and isolate to determine if running away is being planned"); Kirsch,
supra note 69, at 298-99 (summarizing research of four studies on runaway youth published
between 1973 and 1978, and reporting that early warning signs can indicate the possibility of
runaway behavior).
Prior to absconding, runaways are more likely than non-runaways to have experienced a loss
of respect for their parents, mobility and transience, physical abuse, and non-parental supervi-
sion. Id. at 298-302. These are the same characteristics of foster children-separated from
their parents, shuttled through numerous foster placements and subjected to abuse.
71. MILLER, supra note 16, at 209. Foster care runaways tend to run away chronically,
that is, five or more times. Id. at 46-7. Hence, their behavior is more foreseeable once the first
(typically brief) episode ends. Id. at 47, 209.
72. Id. at 207 ("The runaway's own perception of the prevention possibilities is an impor-
tant ingredient in any prevention program .
73. Id. at 208.
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forego homelessness and street life if state intervenors ask the right questions
and follow through on their findings. Unfortunately, this rarely happens, as
many foster care programs fail to act therapeutically to prevent runaways
from leaving. At best, the current condition of available state care belies the
best aspirations of a system originally "designed to do good.",
74
Foster children are entitled to, and in need of, screening and counseling
services designed to prevent runaway behavior. This right is rooted in a
theory of constitutional entitlement which arises out of the state's custodial
relationship to children living in foster care. A survey of federal common
law applications of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to cus-
todial settings strongly supports the view that foster care is a form of state
custody. Unfortunately, a recent trend apparent among the lower courts has
endorsed the withholding of due process protections from children volunta-
rily placed in foster care by their natural parents and guardians. This trend
casts a dark shadow of vulnerability on the thousands of children currently
being raised in foster care. The main hope for these children now rests with
the courts, and specifically, judicial recognition of a foster child's right to
mental health screening and runaway prevention services as constitutionally
guaranteed by virtue of the child's due process right to safety.
II. VIEWING FOSTER CARE AS STATE CUSTODY
A. The Custody Test: DeShaney
Proponents of the foster child's right to adequate care and safe custody
frequently rely for support on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 7" Although the Clause ex-
74. Lowry, supra note 33, at 256. The author, Marcia Lowry, is the Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union's Children's Rights Project. Id. at 255. She describes foster
care as "a public response to thousands of private crises and tragedies." Id. at 256. In the
context of assailing the inadequacies of the child welfare system, she characterizes its concep-
tual origins as benevolent. Id.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law ...." Id. Some advocates have also cited the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment as a basis for enforc-
ing safe foster care. See Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 974 (1984). In Santana, juvenile residents of two Puerto Rican institutions, which housed
dependent and delinquent youth, filed a class action suit against Puerto Rico under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to safe custody.
Id. at 1174. While granting the children relief, neither the district court nor the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit identified which constitutional basis it had applied. See
id. at 1174-87; Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 978 (D.P.R. 1982), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 974 (1984).
However, in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977), the Supreme Court flatly re-
jected an Eighth Amendment challenge to corporal punishment in public schools. The Court
held that the Eighth Amendment is a check only on punishments delivered in the criminal
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pressly restricts the exercise of governmental power,7 6 several federal courts
have interpreted it as establishing a foster child's affirmative right to safe
custody.77 The liberty interest that foster children invoke under the Four-
teenth Amendment is a substantive due process right rather than a proce-
dural one.7" Thus, the foster child's right involves liberties that, like those
articulated in the Bill of Rights, the state may not infringe without substan-
tial justification.79 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the foster
context. Id. at 669. Under this reasoning, the Santana Court would likely have had to rely on
the fact that some of the children had been adjudicated delinquent, to arrive at an Eighth
Amendment right to safe custody. But see id. at 692 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan,
Marshall & Stevens, JJ.) (rejecting the majority's position that the Eighth Amendment pro-
tects only convicted criminals).
Despite possible use of an Eighth Amendment claim in some cases, lower courts have inter-
preted Ingraham as foreclosing Eighth Amendment challenges to foster care living conditions.
See, e.g., Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (rejecting Eighth Amend-
ment grounds for a foster child's claim alleging violation of her right to safe placement because
"the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted criminals").
76. The Constitution is viewed by scholars differently. Some observe that it requires the
government to perform certain affirmative duties for its citizens (positive rights), while others
see the Constitution as a charter of negative rights, that limits what government can do to the
people. For a general discussion of some affirmative government obligations which arise from
the negatively phrased Due Process clause, see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1-6, 15-13 (2d ed. 1988) (asserting that affirmative government
duties extend from the Constitution). But see Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203
(7th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The
men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for
the people but that it might do too much to them." (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318
(1980); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982))), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049
(1984). See also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 864 (1986) (discussing affirmative, court-imposed state duties).
77. See, e.g., K.H. ex. rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a foster child has a negative liberty interest not to be placed in an abusive foster home);
Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that
children in state-regulated foster care have an affirmative due process right to be free from the
infliction of unnecessary harm), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791, 794 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (holding that an involuntarily placed foster child has the right
to be free of unnecessary pain and has a fundamental right to safety in custody), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
78. Lee Teitelbaum & James Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights
and Their Application, 13 FAMILY L.Q. 153 (1978). "Traditional due process analysis com-
prises three distinct inquiries: Has a constitutionally recognized liberty been infringed? If so is
that infringement attributable to state action? If both of these are true, what procedures are
required by the state in so limiting the liberty interest involved?" Id. at 156. Substantive due
process analysis is concerned with the first and second questions, while procedural claims fo-
cus on the third question.
79. There are several rights not listed in the Bill of Rights, which are recognized as funda-
mental by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to
marry); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (right to privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (right to an abortion); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(women's right to an abortion, subject to framework protecting state's interest). In contrast,
the Supreme Court recognizes the right of individuals in a custodial setting to be free from
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child's right to safe custody. However, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services,80 the Court decided that a child living at
home with his natural parent, under the supervision of a local child protec-
tive agency, does not have a substantive due process right to protection from
the state."' Nearly from the moment of its publication, the DeShaney deci-
sion influenced subsequent lower court discussions of the foster child's right
to safety, even though the case did not involve a foster child. DeShaney
concerned a four-year-old boy named Joshua DeShaney who was attacked so
severely by his father that he was rendered permanently paralyzed and pro-
foundly retarded. 2 A medical examination, and later emergency surgery,
revealed that Joshua suffered from extensive cumulative injuries sustained
over many months.
8 3
Joshua's final beating did not come as a complete surprise to hospital and
social services staff. The child had come to the emergency room the previ-
ous year, suffering from injuries similar to those he sustained from his fa-
ther's last attack. At the time, the hospital suspected child abuse.8 4 Officials
from the local Department of Social Services arranged for the child to re-
main in the hospital's custody while it investigated the cause of his bruises
and scars.8 5 Although abuse was suspected, investigators did not uncover
enough evidence to keep Joshua out of his father's custody,8 6 so they re-
turned the boy to his home. A social worker was assigned to monitor and
harm and physical restraint. However, it does not characterize those rights as "fundamental."
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-25 (1982). Typically, the Court has been some-
what unwilling to characterize as fundamental the individual's right to safety. Id.; see also
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673-74. The distinction between an important right and a fundamental
right is significant. Where fundamental rights are concerned, the Court has held that the state
may not limit those rights absent a compelling state interest. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. The
state must make a less burdensome showing to curtail substantive due process rights not ex-
pressly deemed fundamental by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676
(holding that there can be no deprivation of substantive rights as long as disciplinary corporal
punishment is within the limits of common-law privilege). But see Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794
(characterizing a foster child's right to physical safety as fundamental).
80. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
81. Id. at 197.
82. See Brief for Petitioners at 8, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989) (No. 87-154) [hereinafter Petitioner's Briefn ("Joshua has lost nearly half
the tissue in his brain, is permanently substantially paralyzed, and is profoundly and perma-
nently retarded and brain damaged."). Joshua will be institutionalized for the rest of his life.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
83. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 82, at 7-8.
84. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
85. Id.
86. Id. At the time, the relevant state statute provided that a child may be withheld from
parental custody if "[p]robable cause exists to believe that if the child is not held he or she will
... be subject to injury by others." WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.205(l)(a) (West 1987).
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counsel the family, but she provided little assistance to Joshua."' Although
she visited the DeShaney home about once a month, the social worker often
did not observe Joshua personally. She seemed entirely unaware of the boy's
worsening condition despite mounting signs of rampant abuse."8 Just
months before the final, brutal beating, Joshua was again treated at the
emergency room for "a cut forehead, a bloody nose, swollen ear, and bruises
on both shoulders,"8 9 prompting hospital officials to make another report of
suspected child abuse. This time, the response of the local social services
agency was to do nothing.
Through his guardian ad litem and his mother, Joshua brought suit under
42 U.S.C. § 198390 against the Department of Social Services and its em-
ployees. The plaintiffs claimed that the agency violated the child's substan-
tive due process right to a safe environment by failing to protect Joshua from
his father's foreseeable aggression.91 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed the action, holding that the
state's failure to render protective services to a child within its jurisdiction-
but not within its custody--did not give rise to a constitutional grievance.
92
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 93
In a six to three decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
lower courts' dismissal of Joshua's claim.94 The majority relied primarily on
its view of the Constitution as an article of restraint against state interference
87. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192-93.
88. Id. Joshua's numerous injuries included scrapes, bumps, bruises, an eye injury and an
apparent cigarette bum. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298,
300 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
89. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 300.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State . . .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id.
For a § 1983 action to arise where state officials are charged with failing to exercise an
affirmative constitutional duty, two requirements must be met. First, the officials' failure to act
must have been a substantial factor leading to the violation of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Second, depending on the context, the
state actor must either exhibit deliberate indifference to his constitutional duty to act, Turpin
v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980), or a failure to exercise
professional judgment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
91. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
92. Id. (citing district court's opinion).
93. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
94. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194.
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
rather than as a guarantor of state assistance for individual rights.95 Only in
particularized contexts is the government obliged to advance and safeguard
private liberty interests.96 The Court determined that state "custody" is the
setting in which the government becomes bound to abandon its neutrality
and promote the liberties of individuals in state care.97 Thus, whether or not
a citizen resides in state custody became the test of a state's due process
liability for failing to safeguard its citizens from violence.98 On the question
of the foster child's substantive due process right to a safe environment, the
Court expressly reserved judgment:
Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed
Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home operated
by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to
incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative
duty to protect. Indeed, several Courts of Appeals have held, by
analogy to Estelle and Youngberg, that the State may be held liable
under the Due Process Clause for failing to protect children in fos-
ter homes from mistreatment at the hands of their foster parents
.... We express no view on the validity of this analogy, however,
as it is not before us in the present case.99
Prior to DeShaney, the Supreme Court had decided in Estelle v. Gam-
ble 100 that prison officials could be held liable under § 1983 for failing to
give medical treatment to a prisoner. 10 1 However, the majority based its
holding on the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment rather than the Due Process Clause."2 Six years after Estelle,
in Youngberg v. Romeo,'0 3 the Court cited the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and extended the "right to treatment" from prison set-
95. Id. at 195-96.
96. Id., at 198.
97. Id. at 199-201.
98. Id. at 199-200. As the Court observed, only the state's "affirmative act of restraining
the individual's freedom" prevents individuals from protecting themselves, therefore entitling
them to government protection. Id. at 200.
99. Id. at 201 n.9. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). One federal district court ob-
served that the Supreme Court "intimated its approval" of a substantive due process right to
safe foster care. Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Il1. 1989). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit understood DeShaney to permit affirmative state
duties to arise from noncustodial settings. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d
720, 723-24 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). Both conclusions emanate from
an imprecise reading of DeShaney's footnote nine, wherein the Court expressly reserved judg-
ment on the foster care question and did not even remotely suggest that a noncustodial rela-
tionship invites substantive due process rights and duties. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
100. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
101. Id. at 103-04.
102. Id. at 105.
103. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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tings to state institutions for the mentally ill and retarded." ° Considering
for the first time the substantive rights of involuntarily committed persons,
the Court recognized a sphere of affirmative state duties ensuring that resi-
dents are kept reasonably safe, free from needless restraint, and offered as
much training as is necessary to effect their safety and freedom. 10
In the wake of Estelle and Youngberg, DeShaney became the third chapter
in the Court's evolving substantive due process jurisprudence concerning the
rights of individuals in state care. The question following DeShaney is
whether foster children reside in state custody for the purpose of asserting
their substantive due process right to safe placements.10 6 Most lower federal
court decisions prior to DeShaney are not responsive to this question.
Although at least four federal courts had determined that foster children
104. Id. at 314-25.
105. Id. at 324. The government in Youngberg conceded its other duties to provide ade-
quate food, shelter, clothing and medical attention, which the Court described as the "essen-
tials of the care that the State must provide."
106. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
("When the state takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being.").
Arguably, DeShaney appears to rely more substantially on a "state creation of danger" test
than a status custody test, but the text of the opinion reads as an unequivocal endorsement of
custodial analysis. Cf Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459, 465
(3d Cir. 1990) (interpreting DeShaney to impose a status-based custody test for due process
liberty interests); Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that
DeShaney "makes clear.., that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment im-
poses affirmative duties on the State whenever it takes an individual into its custody"), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990); Dwares v. New York, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1412 at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1992) ("Because plaintiff was not in custody at the time of the alleged
incident, DeShaney teaches that plaintiff's Due Process rights were not violated.").
However, the Supreme Court's opinion in DeShaney apparently leaves undisturbed a line of
"police cases" which have found a state duty to act in noncustodial situations where the state
contributed to the danger. See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
that police officers who arrested the guardian of three children for drag racing and subse-
quently left the children alone in the abandoned car on a highway could be found liable under
§ 1983 for their failure to protect the children); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972)
(holding that police officers who witnessed the beating of a man by other officers could be
found liable under § 1983 for failing to protect the citizen). Most recently, a federal district
court refused to dismiss claims brought by a murder victim's family alleging that Milwaukee
police officers neglected a duty to protect their son from a serial murderer. See
Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Wis. 1992). The victim, who
did not speak English, had escaped from his would-be killer and located persons to help him.
After neighbors contacted the police, local officers assumed control of the situation, and re-
turned the boy to the killer's residence in the mistaken belief that the two were gay lovers
engaged in a domestic disagreement. The court observed that "the DeShaney doctrine is not
without some small cracks," id. at 1349, and held that "at the motion to dismiss stage, I
cannot say that no special relationship existed between [the victim] and the three police of-
ficers." Id. at 1350.
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have a constitutional right to safety, 10 7 only one opinion offered an express
constitutional basis for enforcing the entitlement.'0 s The opinion arrived
four years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney, when the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois took up the
case of Rubacha v. Coler,1 °o involving a mentally retarded foster child who
was beaten by other juvenile residents at a state-run shelter in Illinois. The
child filed suit against the state of Illinois alleging that her substantive due
process right to safe custody had been violated. The court found that the
child had indeed stated a cause of action based on her Fourteenth Amend-
107. See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981);
Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966
(D.P.R. 1982), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 974 (1984); Brooks v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In Child v. Beame,
412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a federal district court rejected the substantive due process
claims of foster children to safe custody, holding that foster care is not a form of state custody
to which such rights attach. Id. at 605. The reasoning in Child reflects the federal courts'
minority view, and has been unequivocally rejected by most federal courts. See, e.g., Meador
v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir.) (holding that a foster child has a
liberty interest by virtue of his custodial relationship to the state), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867
(1990); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794-95 (11th Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (same).
108. In two of these decisions, Doe and Brooks, the courts acknowledged a foster child's
liberty interest in safe and humane custodial care without exposition on the constitutional
source of the right. See Doe, 649 F.2d at 141; Brooks, 478 F. Supp. at 795. In Doe, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit identified the foster child's liberty interest in a
safe placement, but did not discuss its constitutional grounds for introducing this right. Doe,
649 F.2d at 141-46. However, on appeal after remand, the court acknowledged that it had
originally applied an Eighth Amendment standard to the level of indifference the state must
exhibit toward a child's unsafe conditions before liability attaches. Doe v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 790 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983). The
court still failed to discuss the source of the child's right to safety. Id. at 791-92. In Brooks v.
Richardson, the court recognized the foster child's right to "humane custodial care," but did
not specify from which constitutional provision this right derived. Brooks, 478 F. Supp. at
795-96. Similarly, in Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984), the district
court's finding that foster children have a constitutional right to safe placements is nebulously
based on either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, with no clarification provided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on appeal. Santana, 714 F.2d at 1172.
These decisions do not necessarily establish the foster child's substantive due process right to
safe custody. But in upholding even an ambiguous right to freedom from harm, each court
observed a sufficient level of dependency in the foster care relationship to warrant a greater
state duty to foster children than the government owes to its non-custodial citizens. The
Supreme Court stated in DeShaney that "our cases have recognized that the Due Process
Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid .. " DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
196; see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (holding that a state has no duty to
provide citizens with publicly funded abortion services); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(holding that a state is not obligated to offer medical treatment to its citizens); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that government has no duty to provide adequate
housing to citizens).
109. 607 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. I1. 1985).
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ment right to safety, and denied the state's summary dismissal motion.11 °
The Rubacha court observed that the Second Circuit had earlier extended
Youngberg's right of safety to all persons who reside in state custody in Soci-
ety for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo.11' By allowing the
case to go forward, the Rubacha court implied that foster children live in
state custody for the purposes of due process analysis.
1 12
B. Defining "Custody". The Lehman Hurdle
In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Service Agency,1 13 the Supreme
Court announced that foster children are not in state custody for the pur-
poses of obtaining the writ of habeas corpus.1 14 In Lehman, a natural
mother of three sons surrendered custody of her children to a county foster
care agency."' After the agency initiated termination proceedings against
the mother, a state court issued a final order terminating her parental rights.
The mother subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to
regain her children. "6 The Supreme Court ultimately decided against the
mother's claim and denied her redress through a habeas petition." 7
The Lehman majority observed that foster children "suffer no unusual
restraints not imposed on other children.""' 8 In light of DeShaney,1" 9 the
observation looms large. The DeShaney Court placed government restraint
of personal liberty at the center of its formalistic distinction between nega-
tive and positive liberty interests.' 20 If the Lehman Court anticipated the
issue of foster care as state custody and intended its resolution, the decision
would supply an answer to the unaddressed question of whether foster care
children are in state custody for due process purposes.
110. Id. at 479, 482.
111. 737 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (2d Cir. 1984).
112. Rubacha, 607 F. Supp. at 479-80.
113. 458 U.S. 502 (1982).
114. A confined person may use the writ of habeas corpus to challenge either the condi-
tions or duration of his incarceration. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). An
applicant for the writ must first demonstrate that his relationship to the state constitutes "cus-
tody." Lehman, 458 U.S. at 502.
115. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 504.
116. Id. at 504-05. The mother sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a),
which requires a federal court to allow an application for the writ on behalf of a person incar-
cerated by a state court judgment.
117. Id. at 516.
118. Id. at 511.
119. 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see supra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
120. For a criticism of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Deshaney as overly formalistic,
see Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 167-77 (1989). See generally Curry First, "Poor
Joshual": The State's Responsibility to Protect Children from Abuse, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 525 (1989) (arguing that the result in DeShaney flies in the face of common sense).
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On the surface, Lehman may appear to quash hopes for a custody-based
construction of foster care. In fact and in law, however, the decision is inap-
posite for due process considerations. As a federal habeas case, Lehman's
analysis of state restraint of individuals is fundamentally inappropriate for
due process considerations. The restraint that triggers individual substantive
due process rights under a DeShaney 2' or Youngberg '22 analysis can be
characterized not necessarily by physical confinement, though that may be a
part of it, but more generally by social blockades to private resources and
methods. Because the individual's access is barred by the government, the
state must substitute its own substantive services by right of the Due Process
Clause. To the contrary, the restraint and custody which are necessary to
accommodate the writ of habeas corpus have historically been associated
with "[s]ubstantial restraints not shared by the public generally. ' 123
DeShaney should be understood to define custody as occurring once the
state exercises affirmative control over the individual, thereby eliminating
access to treatment, care and services. The Court's opinion in Youngberg
supports this view by characterizing persons who are constitutionally due
care and services as "wholly dependent on the [s]tate." '124 On the other
hand, Lehman demands more than dependence and government dominion
to satisfy custody in the habeas context. It requires virtual incarceration.
Since foster children are not "confined" in the conventional sense, it follows
that the Supreme Court was hesitant to designate their circumstances custo-
dial for the purposes of habeas relief.
The DeShaney Court must have considered the Lehman decision when it
articulated in footnote nine the possibility of a substantive due process right
to safety for foster children.' 2 And still, the majority chose not to cite Leh-
man. This omission hints to what is apparent from a careful reading of
Lehman: the Court did not intend Lehman to stand for the broad proposi-
tion that foster children are not in any form of state custody, but for the
narrower proposition that foster children are not in the type of custody asso-
ciated with the writ of habeas corpus.
This distinction is advanced in two sections of the opinion. First, the
Court stated that "[t]he 'custody' of foster or adoptive parents over a child is
not the type of custody that traditionally has been challenged through fed-
121. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
123. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982).
124. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). Indeed, in the due process context,
"[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish." Id. at 321-22.
125. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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eral habeas."' 2 6 This observation comports with the Court's preference to
remain disengaged from family matters which are typically reserved to the
states.'27 In a revealing portion of the majority decision in Lehman, the
Court observed that "Ms. Lehman simply seeks to relitigate, through federal
habeas, not any liberty interest of her sons, but the interest in [regaining] her
own parental rights."' 128 The bottom line in Lehman may result more from
the Court's disinterest in entertaining family custody claims than from any
single precept of its constitutional jurisprudence.
129
Second, the Court framed its holding in language which limited the appli-
cability of the noncustodial determination to federal habeas cases, stating
that "although the children have been placed in foster homes pursuant to an
order of a Pennsylvania court, they are not in the 'custody' of the State in
the sense in which that term has been used by this Court in determining the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus."a130 Thus, as written, the holding in
Lehman applies only to habeas corpus cases and does not foreclose the possi-
bility that foster children may be in state custody for the purpose of asserting
other constitutional rights. Moreover, since the Supreme Court has not
126. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 511.
127. The Supreme Court has typically avoided involvement in many family law issues,
preferring they remain within the jurisdiction of the individual states. In Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982), then Justice Rehnquist explained:
State intervention in domestic relations has always been an unhappy but necessary
feature of life in our organized society. For all our experience in this area, we have
found no fully satisfactory solutions to the painful problem of child abuse and ne-
glect. We have found, however, that leaving the States free to experiment with vari-
ous remedies has produced novel approaches and promising progress.
Throughout this experience the Court has scrupulously refrained from interfering
with state answers to domestic relations questions. "Both theory and the precedents
of this Court teach us solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of family
and family-property arrangements."
Id. at 771 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352
(1966)); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (upholding domestic rela-
tions exception to diversity jurisdiction).
128. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 511. It is significant that the Court acknowledged in its opinion
that the writ in this particular case was being used not to further the interests of the foster
children, but rather as a tool of the non-custodial parent to relitigate her loss of custody and
parental rights. In contrast, substantive due process claims raised by children in foster care are
aimed at creating a better life for the children and almost certainly do not involve questions
about whose interests are being promoted.
129. The Lehman Court explained that:
The considerations in a child-custody case are quite different from those present in
any prior case in which this Court has sustained federal-court jurisdiction under
§ 2254. The federal writ of habeas corpus, representing as it does a profound inter-
ference with state judicial systems and the finality of state decisions, should be re-
served for those instances in which the federal interest in individual liberty is so
strong that it outweighs federalism and finality concerns.
Id. at 515-16.
130. Id. at 510.
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made pervasive physical confinement an essential element of the substantive
due process right to safety,13' Lehman's description of foster youth as rela-
tively physically unrestrained is not dispositive.
Not surprisingly, none of the federal courts have cited Lehman as impos-
ing a barrier to the recognition of foster care as a custodial relationship. In a
portion of a decision which survived a recent reversal by the Supreme Court,
the Northern District Court of Illinois, in Artist M. v. Johnson,32 spoke
plainly of Lehman's irrelevance to substantive due process considerations.
The lower court concluded that "[Lehman] was a habeas case that addressed
a set of concerns . . . very different from those relevant" to due process
analysis. 133 The Artist M court acknowledged that foster children have sub-
stantive due process rights to basic necessities. It dismissed the plaintiff-
children's constitutional claims to particular services, such as timely case
review, only because state officials had not exhibited "complete indifference
to a known significant risk to [the] physical and emotional safety" of such
children. 134 The court held that AACWA gave foster children an enforcea-
ble private right of action to sue states for services described in, and required
by, the Act. These services generally involved state efforts to reunite sepa-
rated families, and specifically included a case plan system plus a follow-up
program of case review. The district court's affirmative holding on the con-
stitutional rights of foster children was not raised on appeal. Instead, its
decision regarding the implied private enforceability of AACWA became the
central issue on which appellate review' focused and, specifically, the nar-
row basis on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 36
In Suter v. Artist M ,37 the Supreme Court reversed the lower court on
the private enforceability of an AACWA provision that directed states to
undertake reasonable efforts to prevent a child's removal and hasten reunion
with biological families. The Court maintained that Congress had not made
sufficiently plain its intent to grant foster children a private right of action
under the Act.'3  The Court's analysis, consisting mainly of statutory con-
131. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text; see also DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009
(Brennan, J., dissenting). "Thus, the fact of hospitalization was critical in Youngberg not be-
cause it rendered Romeo helpless to help himself, but because it separated him from other
sources of aid that, we held, the state was obligated to replace." Id.
132. 726 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nor.,
Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
133. Id. at 699.
134. Id. at 700; see supra note 90, (discussing requisite behavior of state officials necessary
to maintain § 1983 actions).
135. Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1370.
136. Id. at 2008.
137. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
138. Id. at 1370. Prior to the Court's decision in Surer, the lower federal courts had split
on the private enforceability of AACWA provisions under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
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struction, reflected no intention to consider a foster child's constitutional
entitlement to services. Suter, therefore, is not instructive on the issue of the
foster child's substantive due process rights, and leaves undisturbed the Art-
ist M. court's affirmative holding favoring the existence of such rights.
There is a growing consensus among the lower federal courts that a sub-
stantive due process right to safe custody attaches to foster children involun-
tarily placed in state-run foster care programs.1 39 Most recently, in KH ex.
rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 40 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a child removed from her parents' custody by the state
had a constitutional right to be free from harm while in foster care."4 The
decision echoed an earlier Eleventh Circuit opinion, Taylor v. Ledbetter,'42
which held that an involuntarily placed foster child could assert a constitu-
tional right to reasonably safe living conditions. The Sixth Circuit likewise
concluded, in Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 4 3 that "the right to
be free from the infliction of unnecessary harm [attaches] to children in
state-regulated foster homes."'" Subsequent to the Supreme Court decision
1871. Compare L.J. ex. rel. Dorr. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1988) (case plan
requirements of AACWA are privately enforceable), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989) and
Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 512 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); with B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.
Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("reasonable efforts" clause not enforceable under § 1983).
139. See, e.g., K.H. ex. rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 894 (7th Cir. 1990); Meador
v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867
(1990); Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931
(1990); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065
(1989); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 992 (D.D.C. 1991); Aristotle P. v. Johnson,
721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477, 479-80 (N.D.
Ill. 1985); see also Gibson v. Merced County Dep't of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582, 589-90
(9th Cir. 1986) (assuming, without expressly holding, the validity of the analogy between the
circumstances of children whom the state removes from free society and places in foster homes
operated by its agents and the circumstances of those who, by virtue of incarceration or institu-
tionalization, have substantive due process rights to safe custody).
140. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
141. The Court explained that:
[T]he state removed a child from the custody of her parents; and having done so, it
could no more place her in a position of danger, deliberately and without protection,
without thereby violating her rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment than it could deliberately and without justification place a criminal de-
fendant in jail or prison in which his health or safety would be endangered, without
violating his rights either under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the
Eighth Amendment... if he was a convicted prisoner, or the due process clause if he
was awaiting trial. In either case the state would be a doer of harm rather than
merely an inept rescuer, just as the Roman state was a doer of harm when it threw
Christians to lions.
Id. at 849 (citations omitted).
142. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
143. 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990).
144. Meador, 902 F.2d at 476.
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in DeShaney,145 at least three federal district courts had reached the same
conclusion.1 46 The emerging view of the federal bench is that foster children
enjoy a substantive due process right to safe living conditions. Since
DeShaney holds this right to exist only in the custodial context,1 47 each of
these courts has expressly or implicitly recognized that foster children are in
state custody for due process purposes. These decisions contribute to an
apparently growing federal rule recognizing foster care as a custodial rela-
tionship under DeShaney's status-based custody test.
The Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to address the lower
courts' view of foster care as a form of state custody. In fact, the Court has
provided few clues in its due process analyses to what it considers essential
in the nature of custody. For example, DeShaney mentions the state's "af-
firmative control" over the individual and stresses the individual's resulting
inability to care for himself.1 41 Youngberg emphasizes the individual's de-
pendency on the state for care and protection. 1 49 There is nothing apparent
in either formulation to suggest that foster care is not essentially custodial.
Lower courts describe foster children as "defenseless," 150 "helpless, iso-
lated," '5 and at "risk of harm." '52 Many of these children inhabit foster
care's "bleak and Dickensian" '153 world for too long, shepherded from place-
ment to placement at the will of the agency. There could hardly be a cir-
cumstance where the variables of dependency and control were more
obviously engaged. 54
145. See supra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
146. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp 959, 992 (D.D.C. 1991) ("It is indisputable that
plaintiffs [foster children] have a liberty interest in safe conditions while in state custody.");
Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that foster children
"have a substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment" to safe custody);
B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("In sum, plaintiffs [foster children]
have stated a substantive due process claim to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary
intrusions upon their physical and emotional well-being, while directly or indirectly in state
custody .... ").
147. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989).
148. Id.
149. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
150. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065
(1989).
151. Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Taylor, 818
F.2d at 797).
152. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797.
153. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
154. See Garrison, supra note 45, at 1755-56 (discussing state's unfettered discretion over
the lives of foster children to the exclusion of natural parents).
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III. BEYOND CUSTODY: SHUTTING OUT THE CHILDREN OF CONSENT
VOLUNTARY VS. INVOLUNTARY FOSTER CARE
The federal circuit courts have been reluctant to recognize a substantive
due process right to safety for a large subset of foster youth who are "volun-
tarily" placed by their parents or guardians into substitute care.155 Shortly
after DeShaney, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services, 156 de-
cided that a child enrolled in a state-run foster care program by his parents
was not subject to state restraint. The case arose when a four-year-old boy,
Charles Milburn, was beaten repeatedly by his foster parents while in substi-
tute care.1 57 The Fourth Circuit maintained that DeShaney determined the
outcome in Milburn. 15' The court distinguished the DeShaney Court's ex-
press reservation of judgment on the foster care question, 59 and held that
the state had not affirmatively exercised any control over the boy because his
parents had voluntarily placed him in substitute care.16° The court did not
state why a voluntary placement made the boy's foster care experiences, of
restraint or otherwise, less like those of the institutionalized plaintiff in
155. See, e.g., Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs. 871 F.2d 474, 476
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989) (holding that voluntarily placed foster child does
not have substantive due process right to safety); Aristotle P., 721 F. Supp. at 1009 (same).
The establishment of a voluntary/involuntary dichotomy in substantive due process analysis
has infiltrated settings beyond foster care. See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home For Chil-
dren, 921 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that mentally retarded adults living through a
Community Rehabilitation Residential Service possess no substantive due process right to
safety); Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that voluntary
resident at state facility for severely retarded individuals had no due process right to safety).
A 1983 report estimated that one quarter of the foster care population was voluntarily
placed in substitute care. Research Institute for Human Services, Comparison of Voluntary
and Court-Ordered Foster Care: Decisions, Service and Partial Choice, 3 (Portland State Uni-
versity 1983). Dr. Tatara, estimates that voluntary placements now comprise less that 5% of
the national total foster care population, but he indicates that the incidence varies widely based
on existing state laws and policies. Telephone Interview with Dr. Toshio Tatara (March 31,
1992).
156. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
157. Id. at 474-76. When he was almost two years old, Charles Milburn's natural parents
placed him in a state foster care program. Id. at 474. The ensuing two years were filled with
terror and violence. The child's hands were permanently disfigured by suspicious burns and
his leg was broken. He suffered a deep gauge above his eye and numerous bruises over his
body. Id. at 474. Despite repeated hospital calls to the local social service agency reporting
the boy as a victim of child abuse, Charles was time and again returned to his abusive foster
parents. Id. at 474-76. Not until he suffered a painful broken tibia did the state remove him to
a safer environment. Id. at 474-75.
158. Id. at 476. In effect, Charles Milburn's foster parents were not recognized by the
Court as state actors, despite the County Department of Social Services' involvement in plac-
ing Charles with them. Id. at 476-77.
159. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
160. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476.
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Youngberg and more like those of Joshua DeShaney. 61 Instead, the court
created an unprotected class of foster children whose natural parents had
consented to their placements, effectively allowing states to evade constitu-
tional duties owed to foster children, even where the custodial ingredients of
social control and juvenile dependence are in evidence. The decision effec-
tively abandons thousands of children left vulnerable to the shadowy under-
belly of a system ripe with abuse and neglect.
The plaintiff in Milburn raised claims similar to the those upheld two
years earlier by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Taylor v. Ledbetter. 16 2 The principal distinction between the cases was
the nature of each child's placement, which in Taylor was not voluntary.
The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled that when "the state involunta-
rily place[s] the person in a custodial environment, and . . . the person is
unable to seek alternative living arrangements," the state must ensure that
the individual receives "reasonably safe living conditions." '163 The Seventh
Circuit recently cited Milburn, with apparent approval, as "emphasiz[ing]
the state's lack of responsibility for a child's voluntary placement by the nat-
161. As additional grounds for its decision, the court cited the "private actor" status of the
foster parents, based on a tenuous state-foster parent relationship. Id. at 476-79. DeShaney
makes plain that the harm caused by private actors does not implicate government liability.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); see also
Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[H]arm suffered by a child
in the custody of a parent or grandparent is not harm inflicted by the State."); Arroyo v. Pla,
748 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D.P.R. 1990). "Although young children are required by law to attend
school and it may be said that these children are under the custody of the state while they
attend classes, the determining factor in this case is that the death of [the child] was caused
solely by a private individual [who was another student]." Id. at 60. The Fourth Circuit was
incorrect to hold that some foster parents are not agents of the government based on the lax
regulatory policies of the state child protective agency. As the Seventh Circuit recently ob-
served: "It should have been obvious from the day Youngberg was decided that a state could
not avoid the responsibilities which that decision had placed on it merely by delegating custo-
dial responsibility to irresponsible private persons." K.H. ex. rel Murphy v. Morgan, 914
F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990). The state plays a pivotal role in foster care: the nexus between
child and parent. Absent the state's intervention and intermediary action, a foster child would
have no occasion to be in the care of the foster parents and, therefore, no abuse by the so-called
"private actor" foster parents would fall upon the child. Because of this causal relationship
and, more importantly, because all foster parents serve both in an official capacity pursuant to
state child welfare programs and policies and at the pleasure of the state, foster parents are
state actors. See also, Laura Oren, Deshaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due
Process Right To Safety, 69 N.C. L. REV. 113 (1990). Ms. Oren stated that:
In the foster care situation, moreover, it is much clearer that the state's actions have
thrown the child into the "snake pit" and that it cannot be said, as the Court said
about Joshua DeShaney, that the state "played no part" in the creation of the dan-
gers that the child faced in the "free world" outside of state custody, nor did any-
thing "to render him any more vulnerable to them."
Id. at 154.
162. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
163. Id. at 795.
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ural parents in an abusing private foster home." 1" Drawing a distinction
between voluntarily and involuntarily placed foster children is particularly
dangerous because children voluntarily placed by their parents into foster
care comprise a sizeable fraction of the substitute care population. 165 Move-
ment away from a due process right to safe custody for foster children whose
natural parents place them with the state, threatens to reverse the increased
judicial enforcement of foster children's entitlement to safe living conditions
by leaving a large subset out in the cold.
Application of a "voluntariness" standard to deny foster children the right
to safe custody is misplaced in modem substantive due process analysis. The
only meaningful way to reconcile a voluntary/involuntary dichotomy with
the facts of Youngberg 166 is to rely heavily on an age distinction that de-
mands little justice for children. The importance of this point is underscored
by the prominence of Youngberg as the primary, precedent-setting authority
from which the substantive due process right to safe custody is derived.
Youngberg concerned a mentally retarded man whose confinement at Pen-
nhurst State School and Hospital resulted from his mother's application for
a commitment order. 167  Despite the new emphasis on voluntariness,
Nicholas Romeo, the plaintiff in Youngberg, had no more control over his
institutionalization than Charles Milburn had over his entry into foster care.
The primary difference between the two plaintiffs was their age. While
Charles Milburn was a child when he was placed in foster care, Nicholas
Romeo was already an adult when his mother arranged for his commitment.
Courts define "voluntary" in a different manner for children than for adults,
and there is no question that Romeo's placement was technically "involun-
tary." As an adult, Romeo was not legally susceptible to parental authority,
which made his mother's consent irrelevant to the voluntariness of his insti-
tutionalization. Conversely, Charles Milburn's minority status made him
fully responsive to adult discretion.
164. K.H., 914 F.2d at 849; see also Hanson v. Clarke County, 867 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th
Cir. 1989) (reserving judgment on the applicability of "the Youngberg holding ... to a case
such as this where the plaintiff has been voluntarily institutionalized"). But see Wilder v. City
of New York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the foster child's liberty
interest in personal safety is not diluted merely because he has been involuntarily placed in
substitute care) (citing Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 485
(D.N.D. 1982), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983)).
165. See supra note 155.
166. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
167. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1980) vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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These are lawfully valid distinctions, time-honored by the federal
courts.16  For example, in Parham v. J.R.,169 the Supreme Court recog-
nized parents' right to make decisions for their child even if the child dis-
agreed with the parent or the choice included some risk.'7 ° Age, however, is
not the talisman of liberty. The Supreme Court made clear in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth 171 that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority."'
172
Age need not be viewed as a determining factor in assessing foster chil-
dren's constitutional rights. The decision in Parham addressed a procedural
due process claim, and not the substantive due process issues examined by
this article.'
73
The Supreme Court has indicated that involuntariness is a relevant con-
sideration in determining what procedures are constitutionally required for
the admission of a patient to a state mental health facility. 7 4 This does not
mean, however, that involuntariness is a similarly important concept in as-
sessing what conditions of confinement are constitutionally mandated. The
Court has never suggested that voluntary commitment negates an individ-
ual's right to safe living conditions in state custody. And even if voluntari-
ness was a worthwhile consideration, its application to the foster care
context would mean that a child like Charles Milburn could be brought to
foster care against his will, but still be considered voluntarily placed in the
eyes of the law.'17 This result undermines the meaningfulness of voluntary
168. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a Mas-
sachusetts statute prohibiting an unmarried minor from obtaining an abortion without paren-
tal consent or a court order). "We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that
the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vul-
nerability of children, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner,
and the importance of the parental role in child rearing." Id. at 634.
169. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
170. Id. at 603-04 (stating that a child's disagreement with her parent's decision "does not
automatically transfer the power to make that decision to the state").
171. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down a state law that gave parents absolute veto power
over minor's decision to undergo an abortion).
172. Id. at 74. See generally Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987) (challenging the traditional understanding that personal
rights vest with maturity).
173. See supra note 78.
174. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133-34 (1990) (discussing the constitu-
tional implications of involuntarily confining the mentally ill).
175. The age of the plaintiffs in Milburn and Youngberg is not as meaningful a distinction
as Parham may indicate. At least one federal appeals court concluded that Youngberg estab-
lished that "[a] child confined to a state mental facility has a fourteenth amendment substan-
tive due process liberty interest in reasonably safe living conditions." Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320, (1982)), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). Youngberg did not, however, actually involve a child plaintiff,
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commitment in the foster care context. Unlike its application to due process
considerations involving adults, the voluntary/involuntary distinction does
not convey that the child who must endure the conditions of state residency
has consented to the arrangement.
Courts should also consider the integrity of a voluntariness determination.
Indeed, as the term is understood in the law, voluntariness does not neces-
sarily indicate volitional conduct. Doubts about such a characterization
have been circulating for some time. The Supreme Court questioned the
distinction between the "involuntary" and "voluntary" foster care classifica-
tions in its 1977 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform 176 decision, noting that "[t]he poor have little choice but to submit
to state-supervised child care when family crises strike." 177 Parental action
might therefore be deemed volitional when in fact it was the product of coer-
cion by the state or compulsion produced by a lack of meaningful alterna-
tives. Foster care is not truly voluntary when parents are compelled to
transfer their parental rights because of external forces which leave them
without a choice. Although perchance convenient, these "voluntary" and
"involuntary" labels are misnomers. The dichotomy, a simplistic and jejune
exercise, respects a technical divide that is often empty and always illogical.
Several courts appear to have recognized the problem with these labels, and
but rather an adult plaintiff whose mother arranged for his commitment. Youngberg, 457 U.S.
at 309. Because the plaintiff did not personally consent to his institutionalization, the place-
ment was considered involuntary despite his mother's participation. Id. at 310. While the
Eleventh Circuit in Taylor applied the Youngberg holding to children, Youngberg's underlying
facts remain unchanged. Those facts included a placement which, under Parham, would have
been considered voluntary if a child was actually involved, due to parental participation and
consent. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit suggests that an individual whose parent arranges for
his placement into state care (Youngberg) may be afforded a substantive due process right to
safety, even if that individual is a child. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795 (restating the applicability of
the Youngberg holding to children). Thus, a coherent reading of Taylor suggests that volunta-
riness should not be a consideration in the foster care context. It is uncertain, then, why the
Eleventh Circuit took pains to limit its holding in Taylor to involuntarily placed foster chil-
dren. See id. at 796-97.
176. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
177. Id. at 834.
The extent to which supposedly "voluntary" placements are in fact voluntary has
been questioned on other grounds as well. For example, it has been said that many
"voluntary" placements are in fact coerced by threat of neglect proceedings and are
not in fact voluntary in the sense of the product of an informed consent. Studies also
suggest that social workers of middle-class backgrounds, perhaps unconsciously, in-
cline to favor continued placement in foster care with a generally higher-status fam-
ily rather than return the child to his natural family, thus reflecting a bias that treats
the natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the
child. This accounts, it has been said, for the hostility of agencies to the efforts of
natural parents to obtain the return of their children.
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have adopted a broad interpretation of volitional action in cases concerning
the allegedly voluntary institutionalization of mentally retarded individu-
als. 17  Some of these courts have applied a "meaningful options" analysis to
assess whether mentally retarded persons and their families enjoyed alterna-
tives to institutionalization. For instance, one federal district court asked
whether "pressures from family and the high cost and unavailability of alter-
native care" has caused retarded patients to enter state care facilities
"voluntarily."' 179  Probative, thorough inquiries of natural parents would
doubtlessly show that some of them felt compelled by the threat of state
action, family' calamity, or severe poverty, to place their children in foster
care.
At least one federal appellate court seems to have rejected a voluntariness
test of a foster child's substantive due process interest in safety. In Meador,
the Sixth Circuit noted at the outset of its opinion that three children sexu-
ally abused in substitute care had been surrendered to the state by their natu-
ral grandfather after their custodial parent abandoned them. 80 Without
discussing the voluntariness of their placement, the court still held that the
children had a substantive due process "right to be free from the infliction of
unnecessary harm ... in state-regulated foster homes."'' Meador is sound
178. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 784 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa.
1992), aff'd without opinion, 977 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1992); Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359,
377-78 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 484
(D.N.D. 1982), aff'd in part, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
179. Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 484. Another court found that residents of a state institution
have "no practical alternative [to institutionalization] at the time of their admission and [that]
they [had] no place else to go." Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc).
180. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 867 (1990). The Court found that:
David Meador ("Meador"), father of the three children, and his wife, Jana Mea-
dor, were divorced ... Meador was to relinquish custody of his three daughters ...
[but] [w]hen Jana could not be located, Meador gave the children to their grandpar-
ents to take care of them. On December 11, 1985, Gordon Meador, the natural
grandfather of the children, took them to Bowling Green Police Department. The
police then delivered the children to [the country child welfare agency].
Id.
181. Id. at 476. The court did not believe that the Supreme Court's DeShaney decision
required dismissal of the children's action against the state. Id. A recent unpublished opinion
from the Sixth Circuit, however, draws into question the court's apparent repudiation of the
voluntariness threshold to custody. In Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5273, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
25549 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) (per curium), the court rejected a substantive due process claim
brought by a patient in a state mental health facility. Relying on Youngberg, the plaintiff
alleged that she had been raped and that her substantive due process right to safe custody had
been violated. Although the woman arrived at the state hospital under court order, the facility
was unaware of her involuntary admission status because the judge's order was lost in transit
to the state institution. The court stated that "[a]n unexpected and unknown court order does
not accomplish an actual restraint." Id. at *9. It also rejected the plaintiff's claim because of
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because it applies the same standard of care to foster care parents as society
should normally expect from biological parents, thereby seeking to provide a
safe custodial environment for both voluntarily and involuntarily placed fos-
ter youth. 1 2 Several federal courts have adopted this view in the context of
state housing for the mentally retarded."8 3 These courts have looked with
suspicion upon claims that mentally retarded persons, by virtue of their vol-
untary admissions to state institutions, have a lesser right to safe living con-
ditions than involuntarily placed residents. 8 4 Although there may be
relevant distinctions between mentally retarded persons and foster chil-
dren,18 5 one federal court has already espoused this view in the context of
foster care.' 86 As a matter of justice, the extension is welcome. Whatever
the differences between children and mentally retarded adults, neither class
should have its liberty interests weakened because of a formalistic disinterest
in the context of alleged consent.
what the court deemed to be her voluntary admission status. Id. Arguably, Higgs can be
distinguished from Meador because it did not involve foster children, but the court's reliance
on an involuntariness requirement for substantive due process analysis is unmistakeable. The
fact that the Sixth Circuit elected not to publish Higgs may indicate the court is not prepared
to endorse the precedential value of an involuntariness requirement.
182. See Wilder v. City of New York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stressing
a foster child's reliance on the city to protect his rights in the absence of parents or guardians
protecting those rights).
183. See, e.g., Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 377-78 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Society for Good
Will to Retarded Children v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 1298, 1343 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated, 737
F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383 (McKinney 1992) (regulating foster
care); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 396-99 (Deering 1988) (same).
184. See Kolpak, 619 F. Supp. at 378. In Kolpak, the court cited Spence v. Staras, 507
F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974), in finding that a resident of a state mental facility has a right to a
safe living environment regardless of the voluntary or involuntary status of his admission.
185. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Supreme Court declined to endorse a
blanket proscription against the execution of mentally retarded capital defendants. Justice
O'Connor's opinion asserted that mental retardation characterizes a broad spectrum of indi-
viduals who possess diverse skill levels and abilities. Id. at 338; see also id. at 344 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("For many purposes, legal and otherwise, to treat
the mentally retarded as a homogenous group is inappropriate, bringing the risk of false stere-
otyping and unwarranted discrimination.") Although all mentally retarded persons "have a
reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world," City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985), they do not submit as easily to classification as children.
For example, the mental age of a child may be accompanied by a set of expectations typical for
children of similar physical age. In contrast, the mental age of a mentally retarded adult may
be undercut by social maturity and ameliorative therapy. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 338-39.
186. Wilder, 568 F. Supp. at 1137 (stating that "certainly, '[an] individual's liberty is not
less worthy of protection merely became he has consented to be placed in a situation of con-
finement'" (quoting Association for Retarded Citizen's v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 485
(D.N.D. 1982), aff'd in part, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983)).
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Because the state regulates the foster care experience,"' the notion that
voluntariness entails parental autonomy in decisions affecting the child is
illusory.' Regardless of how or why the child enters substitute care, "the
parent [is] required to cede legal custody-the right to decide where the
child lives and the kind of care he will receive-to the state's foster care
agency."' 8 9 The state takes the place of the natural parent, replacing paren-
tal authority with unfettered government discretion.'
9 °
The extent of government autonomy apparent in contemporary foster care
has venerable origins. State parenting is in large part an exercise of the gov-
ernment's sovereign parens patriae power which arises from the state's tradi-
tional ability to confine people who are in need of care or treatment.191
Vested in the earliest traditions of the English common law, the interven-
tionist authority conferred by the parens patriae doctrine is largely responsi-
ble for the power assumed by state agents running local foster care projects.
Yet tradition never excuses or mitigates the misuse of power, nor can it con-
vey immunity from society's evolved standards.
Certain conditions which have led courts to adopt an involuntariness re-
quirement in other settings are altogether lacking in foster care. For exam-
ple, in Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children,92 the Third Circuit
observed that the parents of a mentally retarded man whom they had volun-
tarily placed in a state facility were "free to remove their son."' 93 That is
usually not the case in foster care. Natural parents typically may not re-
move their voluntarily placed children without the approval of the court or a
187. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 323 (McKinney 1992) (regulating foster care); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 396-399 (Deering 1988) (same).
188. See Oren, supra note 161, at 123 (recognizing that "the usurpation of the parental role
[by the state] continues today"). But see Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 828 n.20 (1977) (noting the continued responsibility and rights of
natural parents in their children's foster care).
189. Garrison, supra note 45, at 1755-56.
190. One Massachusetts study reported that 31% of natural parents never had contact
with their child's case worker once the child was placed in foster care. Fifty-seven percent had
no contact for at least six months. Alan Gruber, Foster Home Care in Massachusetts: A Study
of Foster Children, Their Biological and Foster Parents, 51 (1973).
191. See, e.g., Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 94-95 (3d Cir.) (Becker, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986) see also Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Patens
Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978) (discussing the power of the state to substitute for parental
authority); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Pri-
vacy--Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH L. REV. 463, 507 n. 192 (1983)
("In foster care, the state as parens patriae is acting as parent for a child whose family ties have
been . . . disrupted. In that role, the state has created and defined the nature of the foster
parents' interest .... ).
192. 921 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1990).
193. Id. at 465.
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supervising agency. 194 In Jordan v. Tennessee,' 95 a federal district court ac-
knowledged that extensive parental interaction with an institutionalized,
mentally retarded boy effectively undercut state restraint of the child and
revealed the voluntary nature of the child's confinement. 196 In foster care,
however, biological parents are rarely afforded opportunities for extensive
interaction 9 7 because they are presumably unwilling or unable to care for
their children. Biological parents may therefore be viewed as frequently
lacking the capacity or opportunity for significant involvement in foster care,
in contrast to the circumstances in Fialkowski and Jordan.
States restrict a foster child's liberty interests by acting as parents: for
example, by establishing curfews and bedtimes, setting house rules, and as-
signing chores or moving a child among homes. Restraint is not limited to
those occasions when the state removes children from parental custody. The
"restraint" described in DeShaney and Youngberg is a condition of personal
confinement and regulation experienced over time. It should not be under-
stood to describe a singular moment, as did Milburn's involuntary admis-
sions test.'9 8 Certainly government control is apparent at an earlier stage of
the foster care process in cases like Taylor, where the state affirmatively
takes the child away from his parents,' 99 than in cases like Milburn, where
the child's parents surrender him to social care.2" But there should not be a
single defining moment of state restraint, and certainly not one that occurs
so early in the foster care experience. Children cannot lawfully leave foster
care without parental, agency, or court permission. Parental consent to this
restraint, even in light of Parham, does not effect the conditions of the sub-
stitute care experience. In fact, there still lurks a multiplicity of unfit place-
ments, neglectful case management, and a lack of permanency planning. If
biological parents who placed their child with the state could regulate the
child's quality of care, an involuntariness requirement might make sense.
But this is not the case. As long as foster care remains state-moderated, a
child's right to safety cannot justly remain conditioned upon the consent of
parents whose continued care of their child has ceased being in the child's
best interest.
194. Garrison, supra note 45, at 1756 (citing Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.
1977); In re Sanivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316 (N.Y. 1979).
195. 738 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
196. Id. at 260.
197. See Martha J. Cox & Roger D. Cox, FOSTER CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICES, supra note 39, at xv; Garrison, supra note 45, at 1755.
198. Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 474 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
199. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 743, 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065
(1989).
200. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 474.
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IV. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF DUE PROCESS PROTECTION:
RUNAWAY PREVENTION SERVICES
Recognition of the foster child's right to safe custody invites further con-
sideration of the child's liberty interest in receiving runaway prevention serv-
ices as a means of guaranteeing safety. The Supreme Court in Youngberg
limited the type of services the state must offer for this purpose:
As we have recognized that there is a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in safety and freedom from restraint, training may
be necessary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those
rights.... [R]espondent's liberty interests require the State to pro-
vide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety
and freedom from undue restraint.2°'
The Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate an optimal level of state
care and treatment.20 2 But the enrollment of foster children in a therapeutic
prevention program can be accomplished without extending their constitu-
tional entitlement beyond "minimally adequate" levels. For example, in
LaShawn A. v. Dixon,2°3 the federal district court recognized the constitu-
tional right of foster children to appropriate placements and case planning to
the extent those services "are essential to preventing harm to the chil-
dren.''° According to the court, these services are a constitutional entitle-
ment by virtue of the child's liberty interest in safe living conditions, and the
state's duty to minimize emotional and psychological harm to the foster
child.2"5
Preemptive screening and counseling programs are necessary to prevent
foster children from tackling their foster care problems by running away and
submitting to lives of delinquency, poverty and hopelessness. Children who
run away from foster care often encounter a milieu of daunting realities that
makes their street life a bruising and traumatic endurance test.2°6 Given the
201. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982) (citations omitted).
202. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 n.7
(1989) (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1250 (2d Cir. 1984); Hanson v. Clarke County, 867 F.2d 1115, 1120
(8th Cir. 1989); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1397 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
203. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991); see also supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
204. Id. at 993.
205. Id. (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) ("mental and emotional distress is a
cognizable injury under § 1983")).
206. See Mary R. McGeady, Disconnected Kids.- An American Tragedy, 164 AMERICA 639
(1991). Sister Mary Rose McGeady is the President of Covenant House, one of the nation's
largest nonprofit agencies for runaway and homeless adolescents. She addressed the issue dur-
ing a lecture at Fordham University:
Homeless youth have, in most instances, lived through multiple placements with rel-
atives, in foster homes or institutions. A 1991 study indicates that at Covenant
House about 50 percent of our kids have lived in foster care. Many disconnected
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high incidence of HIV among runaways,2 °7 all efforts to prevent running
behavior become essential to the safety and survival of America's foster
children.
20 8
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention believes "the
runaway incident [is] part of a pattern of victimization and an index of fam-
ily difficulties." 2" Running from foster care can result from these exper-
iences of family conflict, or from deficiencies inherent in the foster care
system. Whatever the cause, the runaway phenomenon is all too evident
today. Controlling it requires a comprehensive remedy that anticipates the
child's behavior and creates appropriate programs. In many instances, re-
medial action may target situational rehabilitation instead of private rehabil-
itation. Children who run from misery should not be returned to it. The
foster child's placement, the case worker, or the parents may ultimately re-
quire the attention of foster care agents obliged to ensure the child's safe and
stable home life.
Guaranteeing a foster child the right to safe custody involves counseling
services that deter running behavior. Runaways, including children like Ja-
net D., 210 are typically placed under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice
system once their need for rehabilitation is identified.211 Since foster chil-
dren are constitutionally entitled to "minimally adequate or reasonable
training to ensure safety and freedom from restraint,, 212 a punitive response
youth over 16 years of age who leave or who are discharged from their foster care
placements are poorly equipped to deal with life independently. Many also harbor
negative feelings about their many out-of-home placements. They end up in adult
emergency shelters or on the street, and life on the streets is a dead end. Many are
depressed or attempt suicide. They meet their basic needs by begging, stealing, sell-
ing drugs or becoming prostitutes.
Id. at 644.
207. See supra note 29.
208. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 26, at 48. As the Children's Defense Fund
has observed:
About 1.5 million children and adolescents run away from home each year. Many
others run away from foster care placements or other residential care settings that
fail to meet their needs. Although most of these youngsters return to their families
within a short time, as many as one-third do not. Because many children who return
home go back to the same problems that drove them away, they frequently run away
again. Too many runaways eventually end up on the streets, where their poverty,
fear, anger, depression, and hopelessness make them especially vulnerable to crime,
drug abuse, prostitution, and now AIDS.
Id.
209. Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Proyecto Esperanza:
Community-Based Help for At-Risk Hispanic Youth, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, Sept.
1988, at 3.
210. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
211. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 26, at 49.
212. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
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from the juvenile justice system seems wholly inconsistent with the notion of
"freedom from restraint." This is especially true if an earlier, proactive re-
sponse from foster care could have prevented the behavior altogether.
Constitutionally, states may not act with indifference to the abuse of a
foster child.2 13 Child protective agencies cannot passively confront the like-
lihood of abuse by failing to act. In the same way, foster care agents should
be required to act preventively when they perceive a danger of running be-
havior. The disproportionate number of foster children who infuse the ranks
of runaways nationwide necessarily alerts agencies to the likelihood of po-
tential runaways in their midst.214 In the same way that an agency should
screen foster parents for admission to its program, the agency should screen
foster children for mental health problems and signs of contemplated run-
ning behavior. Based on these screening results and any subsequent indica-
tions of planned runaway behavior, states must offer appropriate services to
help children remain safely in state custody.
There are no assurances that there will not be foster children who refuse
help, or whose indications are missed and then unexpectedly run away. But
it is just as certain that there will be thousands of children whose plans for
running are identified in advance of their flight and in time to be provided
with an alternative to homelessness. The duty of the state to offer these
services to children in its care is fully supported by the Supreme Court's
vision of minimally adequate training in Youngberg. The Court there ob-
served that the plaintiff's own aggressive behavior posed a threat to his
safety and required the state to address his behavior therapeutically.2" 5 For
the same reason, a foster child's running behavior must be enjoined
therapeutically.
Unfortunately, it may be difficult for the federal courts to enforce the fos-
ter child's liberty interest in a runaway prevention program. When deter-
mining the minimal level of care and treatment required by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has applied a standard of reasonableness
determined by prevailing professional judgment, practice, or standards.2 16
213. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 741, 795-97 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989).
214. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
215. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324 (finding that the state had a duty to provide a retarded
plaintiff with reasonable training to ensure his safety, where such training was prescribed by a
qualified professional).
216. The Court in Youngberg explained that:
[T]he decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be
imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that
the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.
Id. at 323 (citations omitted).
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Because therapeutic runaway prevention services are often lacking in con-
temporary child welfare agencies, courts may find insufficient evidence of
professional practices to impose liability on an agency that fails to screen and
counsel its foster children. A cycle of self-interested inertia could easily stall
enforcement of the foster child's substantive due process right to such serv-
ices. Many overextended and underbudgeted agencies are reluctant to create
runaway prevention programs unless pressed to do so by the courts. In turn,
the courts may not press agencies to establish such programs until many
more foster care agencies start to view them as professionally normative.
Inevitably, the real losers are the foster children. For whomever this paraly-
sis stymies, it is certain to mobilize foster children right out the door. Many
will continue to run away, irretrievable to a system whose professional prac-
tices, judgment, and standards often lag behind the best interests of children,
however adeptly keeping pace with the purse strings.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reserved judgment in DeShaney on the substantive
due process right of foster children to safety and protective services. That
question should be resolved affirmatively, as several recent decisions from
the federal courts have indicated.21 7 Foster care is an exercise of state con-
trol over the private lives of helpless children whose families cannot or will
not care for them. Foster care is the type of state custody, like civil confine-
ment, that activates constitutional rights and duties under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By virtue of this right to safe cus-
tody, all foster children, regardless of parental consent to placement, are
similarly entitled to runaway prevention services. The poor health, lack of
shelter, violence and desperation that pervade street life make running away
a harmful experience. It is incumbent upon the state to attempt to prevent
that harm by enrolling foster children in mandatory mental health screening
and counseling services designed to dissuade running behavior and rehabili-
tate troubled youth.
217. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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